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the good, the Bad, and 
the Badass
On the Descriptive ADequAcy Of KAnt’s 
cOnceptiOn Of MOrAl evil
PA R T   1  O F  K A N T ’ S  four- part Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is 
entitled, “Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle alongside of the good 
or Of the radical evil in human nature.” In it, Kant is concerned with the age- 
old question of whether human beings by nature are morally good or morally 
evil. In his 1755 Discourse on Origin and Grounds of Inequality, Rousseau took 
the position that “Men are evil. Grim and constant experience dispenses us 
from the effort of providing a proof of this. I have however proven, as I believe, 
that man is good by nature.”1 In apparent direct opposition to Rousseau, Kant 
wrote:  “If it is said, The human being is created good, this can only mean 
nothing more than: He has been created for the good and the original pre-
disposition in him is good; the human being is not thereby good as such …” 
(R 6:43). Kant’s position, then, was that despite being predisposed to moral 
goodness, human beings by nature are nevertheless evil. This evil is “radical” 
since it not only “corrupts the ground of all maxims,” but “as a natural propen-
sity, it is also not to be extirpated” (R 6:37). Kant develops his position in some 
detail in Religion 1, which, in addition to addressing the guiding question, rep-
resents an important advance in both his conception of moral accountability 
and moral psychology over his earlier moral writings in the 1780s.
1.   The material in this chapter was given as the 2016 Rousseau Lecture, University of Keele, 
Keele, England, March 17, 2016, and as the annual Parcells Lecture, University of Connecticut, 
Storrs, CT, October 28, 2016. Rousseau’s remark is from Discourse on the Origin and Grounds 
of Inequality, 1755, Part 1, Note IX.
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Kant’s conception of and argument for his radical evil hypothesis has 
attracted much critical attention. For example, critics argue that the view is 
unenlightening when it comes to explaining evil; that it involves a simplistic 
account of human nature; that it is ultimately incoherent in its claim that radi-
cal evil is something for which one is responsible despite being innate; and 
that Kant fails to argue adequately for the doctrine.2
Another criticism, and the one I  address in this chapter, concerns the 
descriptive adequacy of Kant’s theory of moral evil:  that is, whether the view 
can accommodate pre- theoretical, commonsense views about evil.3 I have in 
mind two related concerns. The first is about breadth: whether Kant’s theory 
is capable of recognizing all of the various basic forms of moral evil that com-
monsense recognizes. Kant offers a three- fold taxonomy of basic types of evil, 
but the worry is that it misses important “middle- ground” forms of evil. Claudia 
Card raises this worry about breadth when she remarks that Kant “rejects the 
common- sense views that some of us lack basic commitments and that some 
of us have plural and incompatible but equally basic commitments” (2010: 87). 
This particular objection stems from Kant’s thesis of character rigorism, accord-
ing to which, by nature, individual human beings are either good or evil, they 
cannot be partly good and partly evil, nor can they be neither good nor evil.
A second, related worry concerns the so- called depth of Kant’s theory, 
whether his theory of evil recognizes the varying magnitudes of evil mani-
fested in human behavior that commonsense recognizes. For example, when 
discussing moral depravity in the Religion— the highest grade of evil for 
Kant— there is no mention of differences in the magnitude of evil involved, 
say, in lying about one’s age on a job application compared to the evil mani-
fested in brutal acts that result in great harm. As Todd Calder observes: “It 
seems far worse to torture someone for sadistic pleasure than to tell the truth 
to gain a good reputation. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
first act (sadistic torture) indicates an evil will while the second act (telling 
the truth for self- interest) indicates a will lacking in moral goodness. But, for 
Kant, both acts indicate wills that are equally evil” (2015:  15). This concern 
with the depths of evil is brought into relief by the fact that there seem to 
be individuals who are “badasses,” to use an apt label employed by Claudia 
Card in some of her work on moral evil.4 Portrayal of such characters populate 
2.   For a useful presentation of and reply to these objections, see Louden 2010.
3.   This objection relates to complaints that Kant’s theory of human nature is overly sim-
plistic. Therefore, in addressing the worry about descriptive adequacy, I will be implicitly 
addressing the issue of over- simplicity.
4.   See Card 2017, who refers to the work of Jack Katz, in particular to  chapter 3, “The Badass” 
of his 1988 book.
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the world of crime fiction— often inspired, unfortunately, by real individuals. 
However, Kant explicitly denies the human possibility of a “diabolical will,” 
someone who does evil for evil’s sake— someone who apparently fits Card’s 
description of a badass. The concern about depth, then, is whether and how 
Kant’s theory of moral evil can make sense of variation in degrees of moral 
evil, both in deed and in character.
I agree with these critics that Kant’s texts, particularly the Religion, appar-
ently leave him open to these problems of descriptive adequacy. My principal 
aim in this chapter is to develop an interpretation of Kant’s position on evil 
that I argue fits the texts reasonably well and avoids the objections in question. 
If my reading is successful, then Kant’s psychology of moral evil is arguably 
more plausible than his critics have supposed.
To lay my cards on the table, my proposed interpretation (or re- 
interpretation) for dealing with matters of descriptive adequacy involves 
the following five claims. First, I  understand the adequacy objections as 
directed against Kant’s empirical moral psychology and not his a priori tran-
scendental moral psychology. Second, I propose a reading of Kant’s character 
rigorism that restricts it to the realm of his transcendental moral psychol-
ogy, and therefore does not apply to his empirical moral psychology. Third, 
rigorism so restricted helps Kant’s empirical moral psychology address 
middle- ground cases. Fourth, Kant’s conception of the vices enables his 
view to deal adequately with concerns about the depths of moral evil. Fifth, 
properly interpreted, Kant’s denial of the possibility of a diabolical human 
will is compatible with recognizing the moral evil characteristic of the 
badass.
In developing this line of interpretation, I  will proceed as follows. 
Section 10.1 provides a brief overview of Religion 1 for purposes of orien-
tation. In Section 10.2, I  consider Kant’s rigorism, making a case for its 
restriction. In Section 10.3, I turn to Kant’s conception of moral goodness, 
as background for elaborating in Section 10.4 an interpretation of Kant’s 
three grades of evil (frailty, impurity, and depravity). I  argue that accom-
modating cases of impurity requires that one recognize mere lack of good 
will as a generic type of character flaw. Mere lack of good will falls between 
having a good will and having an evil will, and allows me to explain in 
Section 10.5 how recognition of this type of flaw helps somewhat to address 
the middle ground cases. Section 10.6 addresses concerns about matters of 
depth, and Section 10.7 considers the case of the badass. Finally, in Section 
10.8, I conclude with some very brief remarks about the explanatory plau-
sibility of Kant’s conception of evil in light of contemporary work in social 
psychology.
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10.1.  Major themes in Religion 1
In order to provide a proper setting for what is to follow, let us first briefly review 
some of the major themes from Part 1 of Religion.5 First, within the context of the 
Religion, Kant’s aim in Part 1 is to propose a secular interpretation of the Christian 
doctrine of original sin, one he develops from within his Critical philosophy. 
Second, in developing his secular interpretation, Kant traces the source of moral 
evil to a fundamental characteristic of the human being’s power of choice (Willkür) 
that represents a particular orientation of this power in relation to the moral law 
(to be taken up in more detail in the next section). Third, Kant’s concern is not 
with evil actions (actions that violate the letter of the moral law) but with evil max-
ims. “We call a human being evil, however, not because he performs actions that 
are evil (contrary to law), but because these are so constituted that they allow the 
inference of evil maxims in him” (R 6:20). More generally, his concern is with the 
fundamental ground of particular evil maxims and thus with matters of character.
Fourth, Kant is a normative- motivational dualist. Human beings have an 
original predisposition to “personality” or moral goodness, which (in part) 
involves the fact that such beings are aware of the moral law that grounds rea-
sons for action and attitude that are normatively authoritative for such beings 
and who can be moved by such reasons to act accordingly. However, human 
beings are creatures with a sensible nature, and thereby have interests per-
taining to their own happiness that provide reasons of self- love for action and 
attitude that can come into conflict with reasons grounded in the moral law. 
Fifth, moral evil involves allowing reasons of self- love to trump moral reasons. 
Kant refers to the source of evil as a “propensity to evil,” roughly the innate 
tendency, characteristic of human beings’ power of choice, to allow reasons 
of self- love to trump moral reasons.6 Sixth, although this propensity is innate, 
paradoxically it is something for which one is morally accountable. Seventh, 
Kant’s explanation of this accountability is in terms of a timeless choice one 
makes as a noumenal being, a choice which itself is inscrutable to human 
beings, given limits on human knowledge. Because the propensity to evil, 
itself an evil (R 6:32), is something for which one is accountable, and more-
over “entwined with humanity itself, and as it were, rooted in it … [we] can 
further call it a radical innate evil in human nature” (R 6:32). Eighth, although 
this propensity is inextirpable, one’s fundamental moral mission in life is to 
overcome it by striving to become a person of virtue thereby realizing as fully 
as one can one’s original predisposition to moral goodness.
5.   Later sections elaborate some of these themes.
6.   This rough characterization is formulated moral precisely in the following section.
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Finally, another claim that plays an important role in Kant’s defense of 
the thesis of radical evil, and one of particular concern in this chapter, is his 
understanding of the controversy under consideration in Part 1. He explains:
At the basis of the conflict between the two hypotheses … lies a dis-
junctive proposition: The human being is (by nature) either morally good 
or morally evil. It will readily occur to anyone to ask, however, whether 
this disjunction is accurate; and whether some might not claim that the 
human being is by nature neither of the two, others that he is both at once, 
that is, good in some parts and evil in others. Experience even seems to 
confirm this middle position between the two extremes. (R 6:22)
In response to the possibility of there being these middle position options, 
Kant first comments, “It is of great consequence to ethics in general, however 
to preclude as far as possible, anything morally indeterminate, either in actions 
… or in human characters; for with any such ambiguity all maxims run the risk 
of losing their determinacy and stability” (R 6:22). He then proceeds to argue 
on a priori grounds that the middle positions are not actually genuine options.
As I mentioned at the outset, it is Kant’s rigorism, as typically interpreted, 
that is the basis for objecting that his conception of moral evil fails to accom-
modate what commonsense regards as genuine types of character flaw. It is with 
Kant’s rigorism that I want to begin my defense against this particular objection.
10.2.  Rigorism Restricted
In order to clear a path for accommodating middle- ground cases, I am propos-
ing (on Kant’s behalf) that his rigorism be understood as applying exclusively 
to options confronting human beings as members of the “intelligible” world, 
confronted with making the timeless choice mentioned previously. This is to 
deny that it applies to human beings as embodied members of the temporal 
“sensible,” empirical world. As noted at the outset, to do so is to construe the 
thesis as pertaining to Kant’s a priori transcendental moral psychology, but 
not his empirical moral psychology.7
In order to develop this idea, we first need to draw a distinction, making 
use of Kant’s notions. It is perhaps tempting to suppose that “böse Gesinnung” 
7.   On the distinction between transcendental and empirical psychology in Kant’s work, see 
Frierson 2014: 43– 51, who summarizes the distinction as follows. “Transcendental psychol-
ogy is a priori, offered from within the perspectives of our actively employed faculties, and 
normative. By contrast, empirical psychology is empirical, based on observation (even if in 
inner sense), and descriptive” (see p. 45). There is one passage in the Paralogisms chapter in 
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(“evil disposition”) and “Hang zum Bösen” (“propensity to evil”) express equiv-
alent notions. However, as Pablo Muchnik has pointed out, this temptation 
should be resisted.8 As Muchnik explains, it cannot be Kant’s view that these 
notions (or the terms that express them) mean the same.
Otherwise, our personal wrongdoing would be explicated (and excul-
pated) by sheer membership in humanity []. This untoward conclusion, 
however, can be averted once we realize that the notions in question 
refer to two different units of moral analysis: the Gesinnung indicates 
the fundamental moral outlook of an individual agent, the propensity, 
the moral character imputable to the whole species. Overlooking the 
logical independence of these analytic units gives the impression that 
Kant’s talk of a universal propensity to evil is inconsistent with his com-
mitment to freedom. For if we consider “Gesinnung” and “propensity” 
to be synonymous, it seems natural to suppose that the choice at the 
level of the species carries causal efficacy at the level of the individual, 
and hence is at odds with our autonomy[].” (Muchnik 2010:  117, the 
empty brackets indicate deleted footnote numbers)
A slightly different way to make Muchnik’s point is that if one conflates 
the notions in question, then it would not be possible to overcome one’s pro-
pensity to evil; one would be stuck with an evil Gesinnung. It is Kant’s view 
that individuals, as members of the species, have an inextirpable propensity 
to evil, yet as embodied agents they are able to overcome this propensity by 
coming to be virtuous. Following Muchnik, then, I will understand Kant’s use 
of “propensity” in the present context as referring to the moral character of 
the species, and Gesinnung (or “disposition” 9) as referring the moral character 
the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant refers to transcendental psychology, 
cosmology, and theology as “putative sciences of pure reason” (A 397), thus dismissing them 
as not genuine sciences. In this passage, “transcendental psychology” refers to an illusory 
science of the soul, understood as a persisting immaterial substance. Kant typically refers 
to this illusory science as “rational psychology,” which the Paralogisms chapter attempts to 
undermine. However, as Frierson is using the label, transcendental psychology does not 
purport to theorize about the nature of an immaterial soul, and so is not illegitimate by 
Kant’s lights. (I thank Houston Smit for discussion of this matter.)
8.   Muchnik cites a passage in Allison 1990: 153 in which the two notions are equated.
9.   The English translation of Gesinnung is simply “disposition,” which we find in the 
Cambridge edition of Kant’s Religion is problematic. On this point, see Munzel 1999: xvii– 
xviii, who prefers “comportment of mind” that is indicative of the sort of principled mindset, 
which may be good or evil, as a translation that captures the sense Kant assigns to Gesinnung.
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of individual members of the species. That Kant’s text seems to demand this 
distinction is reason to accept it, independently of my use of it.
Since I am proposing to restrict Kant’s rigorism to the options available 
for timelessly choosing the character of one’s power of choice, let us consider 
the key elements that figure in this choice. First, Kant represents this free 
timeless choice as resulting in the adoption of a maxim, which he refers to 
as the “subjective ground … of the exercise of the human being’s freedom 
in general (under objective moral laws) antecedent to every deed that falls 
within the scope of the senses” (R 6:21).10 Second, as noted in the previous 
section, what this maxim represents is a fundamental orientation of the fac-
ulty of choice in relation to the moral law. Third, Kant claims that this first 
subjective ground “can only be a single one, and it applies to the entire use 
of freedom universally” (ibid.). Presumably, what Kant means by “single” is 
just that there is a single fundamental maxim that constitutes the propensity 
in question. By “universal,” he is apparently referring to the fact that either 
the propensity characteristic of one’s power of choice is wholly good, or it is 
wholly evil.11 Fourth, although Kant expresses this timeless choice as adopting 
one or another global maxim, the choice in question concerns the motiva-
tional structure of one’s power of choice. Fifth, this choice is best understood 
10.   With respect to the maxim in question, which for Kant ultimately underlies the adoption 
of evil maxims by embodied human beings, he remarks, “One cannot, however, go on ask-
ing which, in a human being, might be the subjective ground of the adoption of this maxim 
rather than its opposite” (R 6:21), otherwise it cannot count as an exercise of freedom. In this 
quote, Kant is distinguishing the maxim one adopts via a timeless choice from the ground or 
the reason for the adoption of the maxim. What is fundamentally inscrutable is the reason 
or ground that would explain why one chooses as one does. Kant’s text would have been 
clearer had he distinguished the maxim in question from the “first subjective ground” of 
the choice of this maxim. Alternatively, if the maxim in question includes reference to one’s 
grounds, then it would have been better had he clarified that it is the grounding factor that is 
the inscrutable first ground. In fact, in a later passage, Kant hints at this very thing. Speaking 
of the limits of explaining the ultimate source of evil, he says, “We cannot derive this disposi-
tion, or rather its highest ground, from a first act of the power of choice in time…” (R 6:25, 
my emphasis). Reference here to disposition is really, given the proposed regimentation of 
terminology, reference to the propensity characteristic of the power of choice. Thus, it is not 
disposition (understood as a maxim) that cannot be derived, it is the basis or ground upon 
which one chooses the propensity in question that cannot be derived and is thus inscrutable 
to human beings.
11.   The key passage for interpreting the two notions in question is at 6:24– 5, where Kant is 
arguing against the “syncretist” position that the human being by nature is in some parts 
good and in some parts bad. The passage reads:  “For if he is good in one part, he has 
incorporated the moral law into his maxim. And were he, therefore, to be evil in some 
other part, since the moral law of compliance with duty in general is a single one and uni-
versal, the maxim relating to it would be universal, yet particular at the same time, which 
is contradictory.”
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(I claim) as choosing a will (Willkür) that has one or another general motiva-
tional tendency or “bent.”12 Sixth, in light of the third point, and given Kant’s 
normative- motivational dualism and the fact that reasons of self- love can 
come into conflict with moral reasons, what one is choosing is to have a will 
with one of the following motivational tendencies:
GOOD: The tendency not to allow violations of the moral law on behalf 
of self- love by subordinating reasons of self- love to moral reasons.
evil:  The tendency to allow (at least occasional) principled viola-
tions of the moral law on behalf of self- love, by subordinating 
moral reasons to reasons of self- love.13
Seventh, for reasons inscrutable to human beings, one chooses Evil, which, 
according to Kant is a fundamental characteristic of the species as free agents.14 
Eighth, in discussing the propensity to evil, Kant makes it clear that the “unit” 
of analysis (to borrow from Muchnik) is the species. He remarks that in con-
sidering whether the human being is good or evil “we are entitled to under-
stand not individuals (for otherwise one human being could be assumed to be 
good, and another evil by nature) but the whole species” (R 6:25). However, 
this is not to say that individuals may come to lack this propensity; they never 
do as members of the species. Ninth, although the propensity to evil is inextir-
pable, it can be overcome. It can be overcome by one’s coming to have a good 
disposition; by coming to have and exercise a good will. I  understand this 
to mean that by coming to have and exercise a good will, one’s inextirpable 
12.  Obviously, the idea of choosing one’s fundamental orientation of one’s power of choice is 
paradoxical to say the least. For a brief mention of how Kant attempts to handle this apparent 
paradox, see n. 19.
13.  I  understand Kant to identify moral evil with depravity— a principled violation of the
moral law. My formulation here is intended to reflect this. However, this tendency is also
manifested in cases of frailty and impurity, which Kant identifies as “grades” of the propen-
sity to evil. He claims that the “origin” of depravity is “frailty of human nature, …” coupled
with “dishonesty in not screening incentives” (R 6:37) resulting in impurity. See also n. 26.
14.  Here is an appropriate place to mention a possible source of confusion, related to the
distinction between propensity and disposition, namely, Kant’s reference to a “supreme
maxim.” Given Kant’s position on the controversy over human nature, in the context of dis-
cussing the propensity to evil, reference to one’s supreme maxim refers to the maxim associ-
ated with Evil. However, in the context of considering embodied individuals, any reference
to one’s supreme maxim should be taken to refer to the particular moral character of the
individual (her or his Gesinnung), which may or may not be evil— it is possible to overcome
the propensity to evil by becoming morally good, even though the propensity to evil is “inex-
tirpable”. (Further, as I will argue on Kant’s behalf, it is possible to lack a supreme maxim,
so understood, as an embodied individual.)
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propensity to evil is “masked,” to use terminology from contemporary discus-
sions of dispositions.15 One’s propensity to evil is masked when in circum-
stances where otherwise one’s propensity to subordinate morality to self- love 
would be effective, its efficacy is blocked by one’s good disposition.
Note that distinguishing propensity from disposition in the way suggested 
does not entail that the character (Gesinnung) of particular embodied individu-
als falls in the middle, being neither (wholly) good nor (wholly) evil or being 
a mixture of both good and evil. Rather, my proposal to restrict Kant’s rigor-
ism merely opens up the possibility that embodied individuals may have an 
empirical character that falls in the middle. The case for affirming middle- 
ground cases is in Sections 10.4 and 10.5.
Before moving forward let me comment briefly about my proposal and 
provide some reasons in its favor. First, I understand it to comport fairly well 
with the text of the Religion and other of Kant’s texts. However, I am making 
a proposal on Kant’s behalf that may not be what he intended; my project is 
to make Kant’s psychology of moral evil as plausible as possible while pre-
serving as well as possible key doctrines in his ethics. To re- conceive Kant’s 
view of moral evil by proposing a wholesale rejection of rigorism (and all that 
would entail) would be a radical revision. Rigorism restricted preserves what 
I understand to be the essential core of the thesis and so strikes me as a rela-
tively mild revision (if revision at all).
In defense of the restriction, note first that Religion 1 is primarily a work 
within Kant’s a priori transcendental psychology. Kant remarks that the judg-
ment to be made about the question of whether by nature human beings are 
good or evil is to be made according to “the scales of pure reason” and not from 
an empirical perspective that refers to embodied human individuals (R 6:25). 
Note, too, a footnote where Kant is commenting on his thesis of radical evil.
[E] xperience can never expose the root of evil in the supreme maxim of 
a free power of choice in relation to the law, for, as intelligible deed, the 
maxim precedes all experience.— From this, i.e., from the unity of the 
supreme maxim under the unity of the law to which it relates, we can also 
see why the principle of exclusion [rigorism, M.T.] of a mean between 
good and evil must be the basis of the intellectual judgment of man-
kind, whereas, for empirical judgment, the principle can be laid down 
on the basis of sensible deed[s] (actual doing or not doing) that there is 
a mean between these extremes— on the one side, a negative mean of 
15.   See, for example, Johnston 1992.
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indifference prior to all education; on the other, a positive mean, of mix-
ture of being partly good and partly evil. This second judgment, however, 
concerns only the human morality as appearance and in a final judgment 
must be subordinated to the first. (R 6:39n)
What the body of this passage apparently says contradicts the objection that 
Kant’s empirical moral psychology rules out the middle- ground cases of indeter-
minacy and of mixture. I read the last sentence as saying that when it comes to 
judging “the intelligible deed” that precedes all experience, an appeal to empiri-
cal considerations must give way to the judgment demanded by reason. This 
sentence does not impugn judgments of character based on empirical evidence.
Finally, as Patrick Frierson explains in his book on Kant’s empirical psy-
chology, Kant’s psychological theorizing at the empirical level is constrained 
by the competing aims of, on one hand, providing unified explanations of 
the empirical psychological facts, yet on the other, accommodating (without 
distortion) the facts to be explained.16 At the empirical level of individual psy-
chology, then, one would expect Kant to recognize a full range of types of 
character flaw, including middle- ground cases. In Sections 10.4 and 10.5 when 
I turn to Kant’s conception of moral evil, this is what I shall argue. However, to 
set the stage for my argument, we must first consider Kant’s theory of moral 
goodness.
10.3.  Moral goodness
It is part of Kant’s transcendental psychology that all human beings have a 
predisposition to personality, that is, to moral goodness.17 This predisposition 
includes having a moral conscience through which one is aware of the moral 
law and the reasons it grounds. According to Kant’s normative moral theory, 
one’s highest vocation in life is to fulfill the duty of self- perfection, which 
includes cultivating one’s “natural powers” as well as one’s predisposition 
16.   See Frierson 2014: 4– 9.
17.   As Kant defines “predispositions” (Anlagen), the term refers to those “constituent parts” 
of a being, as well as forms of their combination that “make for such a being” (R 6:28). 
They are “original” if they belong to the possibility of such a being by necessity; otherwise, 
they are merely contingent. With regard to human beings, the predispositions of interest 
pertain to one’s power of choice and, viewed teleologically, they are tendencies that direct 
human beings toward certain good ends. Kant identifies three original (and thus neces-
sary) predispositions to good that correspond to his tri- fold division of human nature into 
one’s animality as a living being, humanity as a rational being, and personality as a morally 
accountable being.
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to moral goodness. The natural powers include one’s mental and physical 
capacities, “the highest of which is understanding, the faculty of concepts and 
so too of those concepts that have to do with duty. At the same time this duty 
includes the cultivation of one’s will (moral cast of mind), so as to satisfy all 
the requirements of duty” (MS 6:387). In particular, a “human being has a 
duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, 
in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with 
duty and he obeys the law from duty” (MS 6:387). Virtue (pure virtuous dis-
position), then, is the full realization of one’s predisposition to moral good-
ness and, as I propose to understand it, involves those elements mentioned or 
implied in the just- quoted remarks— namely, moral understanding, cultiva-
tion of a moral cast of mind, and strength. Here, briefly, is how I understand 
them and how they are related.18
Moral understanding fundamentally involves understanding the concept 
of duty that no doubt comes in degrees and involves some grasp of both the 
structure and content of what I will refer to as the normative moral realm. 
The content of this realm (for Kant) includes the basic ethical duties set forth 
in Part II of this work, “The Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of 
Virtue.” Thus, an essential element in striving to achieve one’s moral vocation 
is to develop specific virtues that correspond to the basic positive duties in 
Kant’s system while avoiding those vices associated with the basic negative 
duties. Part of having proper moral understanding, then, is to understand 
these virtues and vices and their importance in striving to achieve moral per-
fection. The structure of the normative moral realm involves taking moral 
reasons that impose strict requirements on one’s behavior to be normatively 
The predisposition to animality refers to basic animal drives directed toward the ends of 
self- preservation, propagation of the species, and community with other human beings. 
The predisposition to humanity refers to the natural tendency of a human being to use 
reason in the service of what Kant refers to as “self- love,” whose ends include the happiness 
of individual as well as the advancement of civilization. The predisposition to personality is 
of main concern here. It is characterized as “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law 
as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice” (R 6:27). This susceptibility for respect 
Kant refers to as moral feeling, and so the full realization of this predisposition results when 
one consistently acts on principles that incorporate moral feeling (so understood) into select 
maxims as one’s sole and sufficient motive, specifically, into maxims whose immediate aim 
is to fulfill one’s duties. This predisposition contrasts with the predisposition to humanity, 
in that it involves a use of reason that is not (or not just) in the service of self- love of the 
individual and the advancement of human culture. The end of this predisposition is human 
moral perfection (moral goodness), and represents that in virtue of which human beings 
are morally accountable.
18.   For remarks the importance of moral understanding in Kant’s conception of virtue, see 
VA 25:633.
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superior to both reasons of self- love and to moral reasons that merely favor 
without strictly requiring action. It also involves taking moral reasons for 
action that favor without requiring (associated with the wide duty of benefi-
cence) to provide one with sufficient (though not necessarily overriding) rea-
sons for action in cases where such action would not violate a strict moral 
obligation or involve excessive self- sacrifice.
Of course, mere understanding of the basic content and structure of this 
complex normative realm is not sufficient for having a good will. In addition, one 
must also have a general commitment to comply with one’s understanding— a 
“moral cast of mind.” This is the “volitional core” of virtue. To have such a moral 
cast of mind includes having made a firm moral resolve to act only in ways that 
comply with the structure of the normative realm, including a resolve to cultivate 
one’s cast of mind by avoiding vice and developing the virtues. Thus, when fully 
mature, the cast of mind in question involves the following complex resolution 
that constitutes what Kant refers to as a good will:
Moral resolve. (a)  In situations where one recognizes a perfect moral 
obligation to perform (or refrain from performing) an action (or series 
of actions), one resolves to comply by acting solely out of respect for 
the moral law, that is, because one recognizes that one has this kind 
of obligation. (b) Regarding general ends that one has a perfect moral 
reason to adopt (the obligatory ends of self- perfection and the happiness 
of others) one resolves to adopt such ends solely out of respect for the 
moral law, and then act to promote those ends on appropriate occasions. 
(c) Finally, one resolves to cultivate those particular qualities of charac-
ter (the virtues) that dispose one to exercise good judgment in comply-
ing with such general obligations, while avoiding particular vices, again 
solely because this is part of what it is to be a virtuous person.19
With this conception of a fully mature good will in hand (composed of proper 
moral understanding and associated moral resolve), we can now characterize 
what it is to have a virtuous character; what it is that fully realizes one’s predis-
position to moral goodness. Virtue, in the highest degree possible for human 
beings, includes the following. (1) One coming to have the sort of “comport-
ment of mind” (Gesinnung) just described, established through a firm resolve, 
and characteristic of a good will, which (2)  is grounded in an understand-
ing of the basic content and structure of the normative realm, together with 
19.   These include the character traits of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic feeling, 
which, together, compose the central duties of love toward others.
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(3)  the acquired strength of will to comply with one’s resolve in particular 
circumstances.
Before moving forward, I conclude this section by adding to my character-
ization of moral resolve. To have genuine moral resolve involves a solemn vow 
to oneself whose content is what I  have just explained. I  understand the vow 
in question to include the following two constitutive characteristics. First, one’s 
vow results in the resolve being stable, where stability refers to its unchanging 
persistence as an aspect of one’s character once it is made. Second, one’s vow 
must accurately reflect the universality of the resolve in the sense that it is taken 
to apply to all aspects of one’s life, rather than to just a portion of it. I stress these 
two features of moral resolve because they play a significant role in the proposal 
I will make concerning the accommodation of those middle- ground cases that 
apparently have no place in Kant’s conception of moral evil. Finally, in both the 
Religion and Anthropology, Kant pictures coming to have moral resolve as involv-
ing a “revolution in the mode of thought” in which, by a “single and unalterable 
decision a human being reverses the supreme ground of his maxims by which 
he was an evil human being” (R 6:47, see also A 7:294). This resolution is a mat-
ter of making or coming to have an unalterable firm resolve of the sort described 
earlier. Making this resolution is the first major step in striving to have a virtuous 
disposition; it is to have a good will. What one must then do is strive to acquire 
the strength of will to follow through on one’s resolve. This is something that only 
happens over time during which one acquires those virtues that inoculate one 
from the vices. It is how one is able to overcome one’s natural propensity to evil.
Having proposed a restriction on Kant’s rigorism and sketched his theory 
of moral goodness (virtue), the tasks that remain are to consider whether and 
how Kant can accommodate commonsense judgments about moral evil by 
recognizing the breadth and varying depth of moral evil. In the following two 
section, we turn to matters of breadth.
10.4.  frailty, impurity, Depravity
The propensity to evil is the principle mentioned in the title of Part 1 that exists 
“alongside” of the predisposition to good that characterizes the volitional nature 
of the human species.20 In the previous section, I described this propensity as 
20.   Kant defines “propensity” (Hang) as “the subjective ground of the possibility of an incli-
nation (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity 
in general” (R 6:29). A footnote to this remark (added to the second edition) explains that 
a propensity is a kind of predisposition (Prädisposition) to acquire a desire for something 
antecedent to experiencing it, but when experienced “arouses” an inclination toward it. 
Kant’s unsavory example concerns so- called savages who, he says, have a propensity for 
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the tendency to allow (at least occasional) principled violations of the moral law 
on behalf of self- love, by subordinating moral reasons to reasons of self- love. 
As a fundamental source of all particular instances of moral evil, explanations 
of all such evil trace back to this propensity. In Section II of Part 1, Kant intro-
duces “three different grades of this natural propensity to evil”— frailty, impu-
rity, and depravity— each representing a particular way in which the general 
propensity to evil can manifest in the character of embodied individuals. Here, 
I  will propose an interpretation of these grades, arguing that accommodat-
ing them all requires recognition of a grade of the propensity to evil that falls 
between having a good will (Gesinnung) and having an evil will. This will open 
up room for accommodating the sorts of middle ground cases Card discusses.
However, before getting started, there is a matter of terminology to clear 
up. As I understand Kant’s use of the term “Böse” (“evil”) in Religion 1, he uses 
it in both a broad and a narrow sense. In the broad use, it refers to any flaw 
for which one is accountable, and so each of the grades of the propensity to 
evil are types of evil. Used in this way, it contrasts with moral goodness or 
virtue. Thus, for instance, the character flaw of frailty (weakness of will) is 
a species of evil, even though it is compatible with having a good will (see 
below). However, in various places in the text, Kant identifies moral evil with 
depravity, which I take to be moral evil in the true sense of the term intended 
by Kant (again, see below). I will be using the term in both its broad and nar-
row senses, making clear the sense of the term in use.
Let us proceed, then, to consider the three grades of the propensity to evil, 
which for present purposes involves two tasks. One task is to explain why 
it would make perfect sense for Kant to identify just the three grades of the 
propensity to evil he discusses in the Religion. A second task is to explain how 
Kant’s conception of moral goodness nevertheless calls for the recognition of 
lack of moral resolve as a general type of moral failing that includes impurity, 
but which (as we shall see in Section 10.5) allows for middle ground cases.
The first task is not difficult. As explained in the previous section, for 
Kant virtue, or moral goodness of character, involves three essential ele-
ments: (1) having a good will (firm moral resolve) which involves a commit-
ment to do one’s duty, (2) from the sole motive of duty, and in addition (3) the 
strength to comply with the demands of duty. In recognizing the three par-
ticular grades of the propensity to evil in question, Kant is isolating types of 
character flaw that correspond to each of these elements. This explains why 
Kant considers just the three types of character flaw at issue. To bring this into 
focus, let us consider Kant’s description of them.
The propensity to frailty (Gebrechlichkeit) isolates lack of strength and thus 
the tendency to fail to comply with the demands of the moral law. Here is 
Kant’s description of this character flaw.
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[T] he frailty (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed even in the com-
plaint of an Apostle: “What I would, that I do not!” i.e., I incorporate
the good (the law) into the maxim of my power of choice; but this
good, which is an irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), is
subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in comparison with inclination)
whenever the maxim is to be followed. (R 6:29)
One way to understand this passage is that the frail individual has made 
a firm resolve constitutive of a good will— to act solely out of respect for 
the moral law and thus solely on the basis of moral reasons in those cir-
cumstances in which one is to fulfill one’s duties. However, when it comes 
time to comply with the letter of the law, the frail individual fails to do 
so, acting instead on a particular maxim whose motive is one of self- love. 
That Kant’s conception of this malady is consistent with having a good will 
finds support in various passages. Consider, for instance, this one from the 
Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant is explaining that virtue requires govern-
ing affect (Affekte), that is, occurrent feeling states, such as sudden anger 
or joy that arise spontaneously and make rational reflection on choice and 
action difficult.21
[A] n affect is called precipitate or rash (animus praeceps), and reason
says, through the concept of virtue, that one should get hold of oneself.
Yet this weakness in the use of one’s understanding coupled with the
strength of one’s emotions is only a lack of virtue and, as it were, some-
thing childish and weak, which can indeed coexist with the best will.
(MS 6:408)
intoxicants and are thus predisposed to form “an almost inextinguishable desire” for alcohol 
once they have become acquainted with it. Although a person may have any number of par-
ticular propensities (some of them perhaps idiosyncratic), Kant is here interested in a global 
propensity— the “common ground” that applies universally to the human species— the pro-
pensity to evil, which he also refers to as the “first subjective ground” of the exercise of one’s 
freedom of the power of choice (R 6:20). As first, it is “posited as the ground antecedent to 
every use of freedom given in experience (from the earliest youth as far back as birth) and 
is thus represented as present in the human being at the moment of birth— not that birth 
is its cause” (R 6:22, see also 6:42). To address this seemingly contradictory set of claims 
(an exercise of freedom antecedent to one’s exercise of freedom), Kant distinguishes two 
senses of “deed”— the timeless choice of one’s propensity is an intelligible deed, “cognizable 
through reason alone apart from any temporal condition,” while the deeds performed as an 
embodied human being are “sensible, empirical, given in time” (R 6:31).
21.  “Affect is surprise through sensation, by means of which the mind’s composure … is
suspended” (A 7:252).
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I read this passage as implying that weakness of will is compatible with having 
a good will.22 The weakness is not in one’s moral understanding, nor, presumably, 
is it a matter of failing to have proper moral resolve; Kant says that this weakness 
can coexist with the best (i.e., good) will. The weakness is in not following through 
with one’s moral resolve, a failure in the use of one’s moral understanding.
If this is a proper reading, then one can have a general resolve to comply 
with duty, characteristic of a good will, but fail to follow through in particular 
circumstances because one’s inclinations of self- love are stronger than are 
competing moral considerations, grounded in one’s understanding.23 Moral 
goodness is having a good will (firm moral resolve) plus the strength of will 
to comply with one’s resolve. Even if an individual can suffer from moral 
frailty yet lack a firm moral resolve (which is surely the case), nevertheless, 
focusing on cases in which one has a good will, yet fails to comply with the 
moral law, serves to isolate mere lack of strength of will as type of character 
flaw.24
In discussing the three grades of the propensity to evil, Kant considers 
impurity to be a more serious flaw than frailty, but not as serious as depravity. 
22.   Unfortunately, Kant does not explain what he means by “the best will.” He cannot of 
course, be referring to a virtuous disposition. However, the German here for ‘will’ is ‘Wille,’ 
which, in its technical usage, refers to one’s legislative capacity as a free agent and, in par-
ticular, the capacity to give oneself the moral law. It contrasts with ‘Willkür,’ which, again in 
Kant’s technical usage, refers to one’s executive capacity as a free agent. I understand the 
goodness of a good will to refer to an individual’s Willkür— one’s executive power of free 
choice. In any case, it is incorrect to predicate good or evil of one’s legislative capacity— a 
capacity that “cannot be called free or unfree” (MS 6:226).
23.   Many interpreters have claimed that self- deception is essential to akrasia. In his illu-
minating 2015  “Irrationality and Self- Deception within Kant’s Grades of Evil,” Matthew 
Rukgaber argues that in contrast to impurity and depravity, akrasia does not result from self- 
deception. He goes on to distinguish impurity from depravity by the “level” of self- deception 
characteristic of each. He thus distinguishes the three grades in terms of distinct psychologi-
cal mechanisms that produce each form of evil. My approach here is to distinguish them 
by relating each to a distinct aspect of Kant’s conception of moral goodness without delving 
into details about the mechanisms responsible for the various propensities.
24.   Well- known is the problem of understanding how weakness of will (akrasia) is possible. 
On the so- called standard view of akrasia, which takes as its model inter- personal deception, 
the akratic individual acts contrary to what, at the time of action, is her better judgment about 
what to do. According to an alternative revisionist view, akrasia often simply results from 
one’s failure to act according to a previous resolution that one has not forsaken. Kant’s refer-
ence to the complaint of the Apostle (in Romans 7:15) “What I would, that I do not!” suggests 
that Kant has the standard conception in mind. However, I see no reason that would prevent 
Kant from allowing that some cases fit the standard model, while others fit the revisionist 
model. For a helpful overview on the general topic of weakness of will see Stroud 2014. 
A related problem is how to understand akrasia given Kant’s theory of action and the role 
maxims play within that theory. For a helpful discussion of this problem, and how it can be 
resolved, see Johnson 1998 and Frierson 2014: 232– 48.
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However, for the moment, I will skip over impurity and first consider deprav-
ity (Bösartigkeit). Kant writes:
[T] he depravity (vitiositas, pravitas) or, if one prefers, the corrup-
tion (corruptio) of the human heart is the propensity of the power 
of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral 
law to others (not moral ones). It can also be called the perversity 
(perversitas) of the human heart, for it reverses the ethical order as 
regards the incentives of a free power of choice; and although with 
this reversal there can still be legally good (legale) actions, yet the 
mind’s attitude is thereby corrupted at its root (so far as the moral 
disposition is concerned), and hence the human being is designated 
as evil. (R 6:30)
As I understand this malady, it involves resolving not to always comply with 
one’s intellectual apprehension of the structure of the normative realm by 
reversing the proper normative order of moral reasons and reasons of self- 
love. The evil consists in “subordinating” (R 6:36) moral reasons to reasons of 
self- love that thereby, according to Kant, constitutes a complete corruption of 
the mind’s attitude “at its root.” Such resolution is directly contrary to moral 
resolve, and this is Kant’s conception of genuine moral evil.25 As he remarks 
in a footnote at the outset of Part 2 of Religion, “genuine evil consists in our 
will not to resist the inclinations when they invite transgression, and this dis-
position is the really true enemy” (R 6:58, bold added). To relate this to the 
timeless noumenal choice of one’s propensity discussed in Section 10.2, a 
depraved Gesinnung is the realization in a person’s empirical character of the 
maxim, Evil.
Depravity, then, involves having a truly evil will (corrupt mind with respect 
to the normative realm). To isolate the essential element of subordination that 
is constitutive of an evil will, resulting in a will that is directly contrary to 
moral resolve, Kant describes a calculating prudentialist who complies with 
the letter of the moral law but only because he reasons that such compliance 
will promote his happiness.
25.   Although frailty and impurity are character flaws, Kant to my knowledge never singles 
them out as species of true moral evil. He introduces them along with depravity as grades 
of the propensity to evil. They hinder the development of virtue and dispose one to become 
depraved. However, true moral evil for Kant involves more than hindrance, it involves 
the kind of principled opposition characteristic of depravity. Moreover, Kant concludes his 
description of depravity by remarking that such a human being is “designated as evil,” 
something he does not say in his descriptions of the frail and impure.
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In this reversal of incentives through a human being’s maxim con-
trary to the moral order, actions can still turn out to be as much in 
conformity to the law as if they had originated from true principles— 
as when reason uses the unity of the maxims in general, which is 
characteristic of the moral law, merely to introduce into incentives of 
inclination, under the name of happiness, a unity of maxims which 
they cannot otherwise have. (For example, when adopted as a princi-
ple, truthfulness spares us the anxiety of maintaining consistency in 
our lies and not being entangled in their serpentine coils.) (R  6:36– 7)
Of course, many depraved individuals are not likely to make this calcula-
tion; it is more likely that such individuals will end up doing horrible things. 
However, again, Kant’s aim is to isolate the fundamental source of moral evil 
in subordinating moral reasons to reasons of self- love, and the case of the 
calculating prudentialist does isolate this source.
Kant characterizes impurity (Unlauterkeit), the intermediate form of the 
propensity to evil, as follows.
[1] although the maxim is good with respect to its object (the intended 
compliance with the law) and perhaps even powerful enough in prac-
tice, it is not purely moral, i.e., it has not, as it should be [the case], 
adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive [2] but, on the contrary, 
often (and perhaps always) needs other incentives besides it in order to 
determine the power of choice for what duty requires; in other words, 
actions conforming to duty are not done purely out of duty. (R 6:30, 
bracketed numbers inserted)
In contrast to frailty, impurity need not involve a violation of the letter of 
the moral law. This much is clear. How it otherwise differs from both frailty 
and depravity has been a matter of scholarly dispute.26 The remarks following 
the second inserted bracket make it tempting to interpret impurity as a form 
of frailty; however, where owing to good luck, one happens to have non- moral 
incentives that favor doing the morally right thing, and which serve to pick 
up any motivational slack that moral incentives alone happen to lack.27
26.   Again, see Rukgaber 2015 who argues that in order for impurity to be a type of failing 
distinct from frailty and depravity, one should understand it to involve a particular form 
of self- deception. I agree with Rukgaber that the element of self- deception helps identify 
a kind of impurity distinct from the other two character flaws. He thinks that without self- 
deception putative cases of impurity turn out to be cases of depravity. However, for reasons 
I am about to explain, I do not agree.
27.   This was my understanding of impurity in Timmons 1993.
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While I do think that this is one kind of impurity, there is another kind, sug-
gested by the first part of the passage. It should be enough for impurity if one 
adopts maxims to comply with her duties but routinely fails to adopt “the law 
alone as the sole and sufficient motive,” even if the strength of her moral moti-
vation does not need motivational assistance from motives of self- love. I have in 
mind someone who does not have a good will because she never vowed to make 
the moral law her sole motive for performing dutiful actions. Consider Mary 
who has no problem avoiding vice, owing to her temperament.28 Therefore, she 
fulfills her perfect duties. Temperamentally, she is also a naturally sympathetic 
person and so performs meritorious acts of kindness for others. She recognizes 
that the fact that an action fulfills a duty is a sufficient reason to do it but rou-
tinely finds that fulfilling her duties, if not pleasant, is at least not unpleasant. 
She therefore routinely acts not from the sole motive of duty but from mixed 
motives. Mary’s moral failing is that she lacks the proper kind of moral resolve; 
she has never concerned herself with vowing to act from the sole motive of duty 
in fulfilling her duties. Of course, were a case to come up where duty clashed 
with what Mary found pleasant or was in her self- interest, she would comply 
with duty and do so presumably out of the motive of duty. Mary does not suffer 
from frailty, but nor is she depraved. There is a difference, after all, between 
not resolving to act from the sole motive of duty and resolving not to. The latter is 
characteristic of depravity; the former fits someone like Mary.29
Now notice the following. If the sort of impurity we have been discussing 
(exemplified by Mary) results from a mere lack of moral resolve, then we have 
a category that fits between frailty and depravity, and so the second task men-
tioned earlier has been completed. How does recognizing that mere lack of 
moral resolve is a type of morally flawed character help with accommodating 
the middle ground cases? The answer is that it helps with cases of indetermi-
nacy, but dealing with cases of fragmentation will take more work as we are 
about to see.
28.   For Kant, temperament refers to one aspect of the character of human beings consid-
ered as merely products of nature and concerns fundamental attributes of an individual’s 
sensibility and (for Kant) include the sanguine, the melancholy, the choleric and the phleg-
matic. See A 7:286– 91.
29.   Here is a variant of the Mary case that makes a similar point. Suppose that Mary* 
believes that the motive of duty confers moral worth on dutiful actions, but that doing one’s 
duty out of love, or sympathy, or compassion are also value- conferring motives, on a par with 
the motive of duty. Further, suppose that Mary* has vowed to comply with duty from what 
she takes to be morally significant value- conferring motives. According to Kant, Mary* has 
a false belief about proper moral motivation and thus a false conception of proper moral 
resolve. Mary* like Mary is not frail, nor is she depraved. Her “moral” motivation is not 
pure. She, of course, differs from Mary in having resolved to fulfill duties from motives 
other than duty.
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10.5.  Mischief in the Middle
As mentioned at the outset, Card criticizes Kant’s conception of evil as not able 
to countenance so- called cases of moral indeterminacy and cases of moral frag-
mentation, which, she claims, commonsense recognizes as such. There are two 
issues here to be distinguished. The first is whether Kant’s conception of evil 
can accommodate the cases in question. The second is whether, if so, Kant’s 
handling of these cases agrees with the commonsense conception of them. 
With regard to the case of indeterminacy, I think the answer to both questions is 
“yes.” With regard to moral fragmentation, I think the answer to the first ques-
tion is “yes,” and to the second question no. However, I do not think the “no” 
answer is particularly damaging to the overall adequacy of Kant’s view.
Consider first Card’s case of indeterminacy featuring someone who is 
morally capricious— a moral flip- flopper:
Consider someone who is unpredictably irresponsible. Some days, 
she feels like not getting up for work (or like getting up and playing 
hooky) and so calls in sick, not from weakness but because then incli-
nation just seems more important. Other days, she is moved by obliga-
tion, despite feeling it would be a great relief to stay home and unplug 
the phone. She does the right thing then because that is what seems 
most important then. This woman appears ambivalent— not frail, 
not even committed to self- interest, but basically uncommitted … . 
The common- sense view is that she is immature, has not “got her act 
together,” has not yet developed a fundamental commitment (and pos-
sibly never will). Yet we also tend to hold that against her. (2010: 87)
This is someone who, as Card says, “exhibits unpredictably different patterns 
in the same contexts, a fairly common case” (2010:  88). As Card notes, it 
would be implausible for Kant to respond by claiming that this person’s basic 
commitment changes often. The sort of commitment characteristic of moral 
resolve must be something stable in that it persists over a stretch of time. 
Pretty clearly, the person Card describes simply lacks moral resolve. She is 
not frail, as Card notes, and she does not fit Kant’s characterization of deprav-
ity, of having a fundamental commitment that subordinates moral reasons to 
reasons of self- love.30 If we recognize on Kant’s behalf that mere lack of moral 
30.   Of course, she does allow reasons of self- love to motivate her when she wrongfully plays 
hooky, but this is also true of the morally frail, and so this fact about the flip- flopper is not 
sufficient for being depraved.
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resolve is a character flaw, then along with select cases of impurity, one should 
include cases of moral indeterminacy characteristic of the flip- flopper as a 
species of this particular kind of character flaw.
Although Kant does not include the case of indeterminacy among the 
basic propensities to evil, he does address such cases when discussing the 
notion of character. In his Anthropology, Kant contrasts a person of principle 
with persons who act guided by the “unstable condition of instinct” (A 7:294).
[T] o have a character signifies that property of the will by which the 
subject binds himself to definite practical principles [i.e., stable max-
ims, M.T.31] that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own 
reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed be false and 
incorrect, nevertheless, the formal element of the will in general, to act 
according to firm principles (not to fly off hither and yon, like a swarm 
of gnats), has something precious and admirable about it; for it is also 
something rare. (A 7:292)32
A person with a good will is a person of moral principle. A  person with a 
depraved will is also principled, though mistaken in their evaluative priorities. 
Card’s flip- flopper is someone who lacks character, so understood. Certainly, 
for Kant, lack of character is a serious character flaw.33 I conclude that Kant’s 
conception of moral evil does recognize this case of indeterminacy and that 
it does agree with commonsense that such cases are ones of indeterminacy.
The more complicated case is moral fragmentation in which common 
sense would allegedly judge this person partly good and partly evil. While 
31.   The reference to principles here must be to maxims rather than moral laws in order 
to accommodate instances of evil character. On this point, see Frierson 2006, who cites a 
passage in the anthropology lecture notes (25:1384– 5) which has Kant making this explicit 
in lecture.
32.   Kant describes the temperament of poets in a way similar to Card’s unpredictable hooky 
player. He speculates about the seeming caprice of poets who by temperament differ from 
“lawyers and others in the learned professions” in having a “peculiarity, which concerns 
character, namely of having no character, but being capricious, moody and (without malice) 
unreliable” (A 7:249).
33.   Kant’s remarks about persons of principle, suggests that even someone like the early 
Roman dictator Sulla (c. 138 bc– 78 bc), who Kant describes as having an evil will, and thus 
a depraved disposition, is less bad than someone lacking in principle. See A 7:293. This 
seems to conflict with Kant’s ranking of depravity as morally worse than impurity. The only 
way I see to reconcile these claims is to interpret Kant as holding that depravity is at least 
instrumentally less bad than lack of character, because, as he writes, “By character [which 
he thinks Sulla does have, M.T.] one can get the upper hand over temperamental malicious-
ness” (ibid.). Kant thinks this is much harder to do, if one lacks commitment to principles.
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the flip- flopper displays unpredictable reactions across the same contexts, the 
fragmented person displays a lack of unity of will in exhibiting systematically 
different and conflicting patterns of behavior in different contexts. Again, let 
us consider Card’s example taken from the memoir of Sue William Silverman, 
daughter of Irwin Silverman who was chief counsel to the US secretary of the 
interior from 1933 to 1953.34
[Silverman] played key roles in establishing statehood for Alaska and 
Hawaii, Philippine independence, the creating of the Puerto Rico 
Commonwealth, home rule for the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Samoa, 
and civilian rule of Japanese possessions after World War II. From 1954 
to 1958 he was president of large banks. He was photographed with 
President Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, and other influential politi-
cal figures. And he was a child molester. For many years he assaulted 
his daughter sexually, severely, locking her door at night in her bed-
room, beginning when she was less than five. (2010: 89)
Here is Card’s commentary on this case:
Were those who placed this man in positions of public trust totally 
deceived about his character? Or did he have a good side and an evil 
side? He appears at first to have embodied the contradiction Kant 
thought impossible. If, however, we regard him as responsible for both 
patterns of behavior, and if they truly do manifest conflicting princi-
ples or priorities that he has, his character is not at its most basic level 
defined by these principles (hence, does not exhibit the contradiction 
Kant rejected). Rather, at its most basic level his character is defined 
by his failure to take responsibility for himself in a way that people 
with more coherent or conventional inclinations might never have to. 
This kind of failure is not captured by a formal maxim prioritizing 
self- interest. The task facing this man it to create a coherent self. Nor 
is his failure well captured by frailty. How much strength could it take 
not to rape one’s five- year- old daughter and continue doing so behind a 
locked door for years? There is a policy here, not a lapse. (ibid.)
For this Jekyll/ Hyde case to challenge Kant’s apparent denial that a per-
son could be a mixture of moral good and evil, we would have to interpret 
34.   S.  W. Silverman, Because I  Remember Terror, Father, I  Remember You (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996).
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Silverman’s work as chief counsel as properly morally motivated— fulfilling 
his duties from the sole motive of duty. Card remarks that perhaps Silverman’s 
behavior in his job was motivated by self- love (reputation and money). 
However, she also points out that it is possible that Silverman “made moral 
decisions conscientiously on the job (asking seriously whether he could uni-
versalize the maxims of his actions).”
In considering this case, and whether it is a problem for Kant’s conception 
of moral evil, we first have to ask ourselves whether common sense agrees 
with Card that a global evaluation of Silverman is that he is partly good and 
evil. I  am not sure. My impression of Silverman was that he was a moral 
monster, despite subordinating self- interest to duty in his public life as chief 
counsel. However, leave this point aside. Let us instead consider how Card is 
conceiving of this case and why she thinks Kant’s conception of moral evil 
cannot recognize it.
First, notice that Card is thinking that because Silverman lacks the kind of 
moral resolve that constitutes a good Gesinnung, he is not morally good. Recall 
that on the conception of moral resolve I  propose on Kant’s behalf, one’s 
resolve must be both stable and universal. If Silverman did resolve to perform 
his public duties conscientiously, out of the sole motive of duty, then whatever 
resolve he had in carrying out his public duties, it did not extend to all aspects 
of his life; it lacked the essential element of universality. Therefore, Card is 
correct in claiming that on Kant’s view, Silverman lacks a good Gessinung. 
Furthermore, according to Card’s description of him, Silverman lacks an evil 
Gesinnung because having one would require that Silverman have a global 
commitment to subordinate morality to self- love, which he presumably did 
not have. Therefore, because Kant’s conception of evil cannot recognize such 
cases of fragmentation, his view completely overlooks this sort of case, and so 
is at odds with common sense.
However, there is more to Kant’s conception of evil than Card recognizes. 
Recall that evil is a matter of subordinating moral reasons to reasons of self- 
love. What Card overlooks is that this subordination may occur in two ways. 
The calculating prudentialist who embraces a global commitment to subordi-
nate morality to self- love represents one way, which is how Card is thinking 
of moral evil on Kant’s view. Yet another way is represented by someone who 
simply possesses some particular vice, which need not involve a global com-
mitment to subordinating moral reasons to reasons of self- love. The particular 
vices that Kant discusses in the Metaphysics of Morals is an important element 
of Kant’s theory of evil. Here is an appropriate place to bring them into view.
Evil is a matter of subordination, and on Kant’s view of the particular vices, this 
is precisely what they involve. Kant connects vices with passions (Leidenschaften).
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A passion is a sensible desire that has become a lasting inclination (e.g., 
hatred, as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up 
to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon 
it and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to 
brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as 
something premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then properly 
evil, that is, a true vice. (MS 6:408)
The sort of principled opposition to the moral law that characterizes a par-
ticular vice involves subordinating certain moral reasons to reasons of self- 
love. This is what makes a vice properly evil. Suppose we agree with Card that 
Silverman lacks a global commitment to subordinating morality to self- love. 
It is still open to Kant to claim that Silverman is evil in light of the vice of mal-
ice that he apparently had toward his daughter. Furthermore, to suppose that 
the only way Kant can accommodate this case is to attribute to Silverman the 
kind of global commitment to subordinating morality to self- love, is based on 
a mistaken conception of the propensity to evil. Recall from Section 10.2, the 
normative orientation constitutive of this propensity is properly formulated 
as follows:
evil: The tendency to allow (at least occasionally) principled violations 
of the moral law on behalf of self- love, because of subordinating moral 
reasons to reasons of self- love.
The parenthetical remark is important, indicating that this global tendency 
can be realized by having vices, regardless of whether one has some global 
commitment to subordinate morality to self- love. Therefore, I think Card is 
mistaken in claiming that Kant’s conception of evil completely overlooks the 
case of Silverman.
I imagine that Card would respond by claiming that even if Kant’s concep-
tion does not overlook this case, it still does not accommodate common sense 
because on that conception Silverman is partly good and partly evil, and accord-
ing to Kant (on my reading) he is just evil. Yet I think Kant’s view is not so far off 
from common sense as Card would have us believe. Let me explain.
I grant that on Kant’s view, and speaking of a global assessment of Silverman’s 
character, he was evil; he had an evil Gesinnung. However, at another level of 
description, it is also true that in certain parts of his life (we are assuming) 
Silverman displayed some morally admirable traits, while in other parts he dis-
played some morally deplorable traits. For this reason, he failed to have a unified 
self; he was morally fragmented. Certainly, Kant can say all this, which is a way 
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of partially accommodating what Card takes to be a commonsense reaction to 
Silverman.
Before summing up, I wish to raise an issue about Kant’s conception of 
evil that the case of Silverman brings to light. The issue concerns the rela-
tion between particular vices and being an overall vicious person. A similar 
question concerns the relation between particular virtues and being an overall 
virtuous person: which virtues and how many are required for an individual 
to be an overall virtuous person.35 If having any vice, for Kant, is sufficient for 
being an overall evil person, then it would seem that on Kant’s view there is a 
very low bar for being evil, and this may go counter to commonsense. Because 
Silverman’s consistent and cruel treatment of his daughter is horrifying, judg-
ing him an evil person is, I think, a fair verdict about his character. However, 
consider the vice of gluttony, which Kant discusses, and imagine a committed 
glutton. If this were his only vice, would we say that he is an evil person? Of 
course not! However, if any subordination of morality to self- love reveals an 
overall evil character, then Kant’s view, after all, would not accommodate a 
range of commonsense moral judgments about character. Now notice that if 
Kant’s conception of evil sets a very low bar for having an evil Gesinnung, the 
result is a conception of good and evil that verges on a kind of rigorism at the 
level of empirical character. Whether this is problematic for Kant’s view, I will 
here leave open.
To sum up the last two sections, in Section 10.4 I  argued that there is 
reason for Kant to recognize mere lack of good will (good Gesinnung) as a 
character flaw that occupies a middle ground between good and evil. I made 
a case for this by reflecting on certain cases of impurity. In this section, 
I  argued that Kant’s conception of evil does accommodate cases of moral 
indeterminacy of the sort Card describes: such individuals lack determinate 
character, which is a type of flaw. With regard to cases of moral fragmenta-
tion, I argued that at least in the case of Irving Silverman, Kant’s view would 
be that he has an evil Gesinnung. Yet Kant’s view can somewhat accommodate 
commonsense when one considers the particular traits— some admirable, 
some deplorable— Silverman displayed. Finally, the Silverman case raises the 
general issue about the relation between particular vices and one’s overall 
character, and how in particular to conceive this relation on Kant’s theory of 
moral evil.
Let us now move on to consider questions about the depth of evil on 
Kant’s view.
35.   For one treatment of this question, see Adams 2006: ch. 8.
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10.6.  the Depths of Evil
Recall Todd Calder’s objection that Kant’s conception of moral evil cannot 
discriminate degrees of evil and that truth- telling from the sole motive of self- 
love is as evil as sadistic torture for pleasure. This objection relies upon con-
ceiving Kant’s conception of moral evil entirely in terms of whether one has 
subordinated moral reasons to reasons of self- love. The thought, then, is that 
if two actions involve such subordination, then they are equally evil, contrary 
to commonsense judgments about a range of cases, including the ones Calder 
describes. Kant’s emphasis in the Religion on overarching commitments and 
the subordination of moral reasons to reasons of self- love no doubt fuels this 
objection.
However, the resources for addressing this objection are not in the Religion. 
One must look to Kant’s conception of the vices, in particular, the so- called 
vices of hatred that include envy, ingratitude, and malice. These vices corre-
spond to the ethical duties of love (and the associated virtues)— beneficence, 
gratitude, and sympathetic feeling— that Kant discusses in the Metaphysics of 
Morals. In that work, his treatment of these duties and corresponding vices 
is relatively brief and he does not delve into the psychology of these vices. 
However, in the student lecture notes one finds remarks that clearly indicate 
that Kant’s conception of moral evil does accommodate commonsense judg-
ments about depth.36
In the Collins lecture notes, Kant is reported as saying:
All three, ingratitude (ingratitude qualificata) [aggravated ingratitude, 
hatred of a benefactor], envy, and Schadenfreude, are devilish vices because 
they evince an immediate inclination to evil. That man should have a 
mediate inclination to evil is human and natural; the miser, for example, 
would like to acquire everything; but he takes no pleasure in the other 
having nothing at all. There are vices, therefore, that are both evil directly 
and indirectly. These three are those that are directly evil. (VE 27:440)37
Here, the evil Kant is referring to concerns the evil of harming others. 
Vices in which one has an immediate inclination to harm others are what 
Kant calls “devilish” in the lectures. One has an immediate inclination (habit-
ual desire) for something when one desires a state of affairs just for its own 
36.   What follows repeats some of the discussion of the devilish vices in Section 9.3.
37.   The bracketed material is the footnote in the English translation edition to the Latin 
phrase.
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sake. By contrast, the miser is moved by an immediate inclination to accumu-
late money in excess of his needs; this inclination does not include harming 
others. Note the mention of hatred. As Kant conceives these vices, particular 
manifestations of them may involve hate, and hatred adds to the degree of evil 
such traits realize. Consider this remark, again in the Collins notes, concern-
ing the matter of degree.
If this ingratitude increases so much that he cannot endure his bene-
factor and becomes his enemy, that is the devilish degree of vice, since 
it is utterly repugnant to human nature, to hate and prosecute those 
who have done one a kindness. (VE 27:439)
Being ungrateful toward one’s benefactor is an evil— a vice. However, 
ingratitude accompanied by hatred represents, as mentioned in the passage, 
a “greater degree” of evil. Therefore, with respect to the evil manifested in 
one’s possessing one of the devilish vices, Kant is clear that the evil realized 
can vary in degree.
Moreover, in setting forth his system of ethical duties, Kant sometimes 
compares vices with respect to the degree to which they manifest disrespect 
for the dignity of others and of oneself. Kant claims, for instance, that glut-
tony is worse than drunkenness— a greater evil (MS 6:427). Therefore, with 
respect to manifestations of a single type of vice and with respect to distinct 
types of vice, Kant’s conception of moral evil recognizes variations in degree.
Let us go back to Calder’s contrast between truth telling from self- interest, 
and sadistic torture. Truth telling from self- interest may or may not express 
an evil character. Kant does not condemn as evil complying with duty from 
non- moral motives. However, consider again the case of the calculating pru-
dentialist who, according to Kant, has an evil character. It is such a case that 
Calder needs in order for his comparison to be apt. However, I do not see any 
reason why Kant cannot say that although both have an evil character, that 
nevertheless the sadist, because her behavior manifests the vices of hatred (let 
us assume), is far more vicious than the truth- telling prudentialist. Therefore, 
I do not think Kant’s conception of evil fails to accommodate differences in 
degrees of moral evil.
10.7.  the Badass
The “badass,” according to Card, is someone who does evil things because they 
are evil— evil for evil’s sake. The aspiring badass, she claims, is not someone who 
does evil things in order to be respected by other badasses. “A real badass does 
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not care what others think. To deserve their respect, one must not act for the sake 
of it. Rather, one must become a certain kind of person” (2016: 37). Card draws a 
comparison between the genuine badass and someone who has a Kantian good 
will. For Kant, in order to deserve happiness as well as to be worthy of the esteem 
of an impartial rational spectator, one must have a good will, motivated not by the 
desire to be esteemed or to be happy; rather one must be motivated by recogniz-
ing the independent worth of a good will. Only then is one worthy of the esteem 
of an impartial spectator and of the happiness that a good will merits. Similarly, 
in order to be a genuine badass worthy of esteem from other badasses, one must 
be, for example, cruel and ruthless, and become the kind of person who takes 
immediate satisfaction in exercising such qualities of character. This is Card’s 
conception of someone who does evil for the sake of evil, is cruel for the sake of 
being cruel, ruthless for the sake of being ruthless, and so on.
A commonly voiced complaint about Kant’s conception of evil is that he 
explicitly denies that human beings are capable of having what he calls a “dia-
bolical will” (R 6:35). In commenting on the propensity to evil (depravity), Kant 
remarks that it should not be called “malice” because this term, taken strictly, 
would be “a disposition (a subjective principle of maxims) to incorporate evil qua 
evil for incentives into one’s maxim (since this is diabolical)” (R 6:37). These 
remarks are taken as clear indication that Kant denies the possibility of a type of 
individual who seems not only possible but also actual, and thus as an indication 
that Kant’s conception of human nature is too narrow, if not naïve.38 Card writes:
Kant’s theory of radical evil in human nature is not radical enough to 
comprehend taking pride in being bad. Pride so grounded seems to 
presuppose what Kant called diabolical evil, doing evil for evil’s sake, for 
which he found no basis in human nature (2016: 38).
If one supposes that Kant held this because he thought this putative type of 
evil is of a magnitude not possible for humans, then the possibility of the 
badass shows that Kant’s view lacks breadth because it lacks depth.
Let us agree with Card that the badass she discusses is someone who 
counts as doing evil for evil’s sake.39 The question is whether Kant’s view can 
38.   See, for example, Silber 1960 and Bernstein 2002.
39.   I understand “doing evil for evil’s sake” to refer to someone who, for example, takes 
satisfaction in the infliction suffering of others just because it is evil, and not because such a 
person as Stanley Benn puts it, “sees it, in some partial or distorted way, as a good, even for 
himself. He does not think of himself better off for it; he is no less disinterested in rejoicing 
in it than is a benevolent person who rejoices in someone’s good fortune” (1985: 806). For 
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accommodate evil individuals of this sort without having to recant his claim 
about diabolical wills. I think it can once we address questions about the sort 
of diabolical evil that Kant denies is humanly possible and about the psychol-
ogy of the badass.
Why, then, does Kant deny the possibility of a diabolical will? Notice first 
that in the quoted passage from the Religion two paragraphs ago, Kant is 
referring to a “disposition (a subjective principle of maxims)” and claims that 
one should not call this disposition “malice.” However, malice is one of the 
principal vices of hatred, so Kant does not deny that human beings can do 
evil things motivated by malicious hatred. How, then, can Kant both deny 
that human beings cannot have a malicious disposition, yet recognize malice 
as vice?
Here is a proposal, informed by my earlier remarks about the need to dis-
tinguish claims that figure in Kant’s transcendental psychology from those 
that belong to empirical psychology. Suppose we interpret (or re- interpret if 
you like) Kant’s denial that depravity is malice, as referring to a claim about 
the nature of the human will and, in particular about fundamental sources of 
one’s normative reasons for acting, rather than referring to one’s empirical 
character (Gesinnung). Recall, that for Kant, human beings have a three- fold 
predisposition to good.40 The two of interest here are the predisposition to 
humanity (the source of reasons of self- love) and the predisposition to person-
ality (the source of the moral reasons, including the capacity to act for such 
reasons independently of reasons of self- love). Together these two predispo-
sitions constitute Kant’s normative- motivational dualism of human nature. 
For Kant, there is no predisposition to evil, as such; rather, one’s evil nature 
is a propensity to subordinate moral reasons to reasons of self- love. Indeed, 
Kant’s view is that it is not possible to conceive of human beings as having a 
predisposition to evil. What would constitute, for Kant, such a predisposition?
To answer this question, one starts by imagining a being with a predisposi-
tion to evil instead of having a predisposition to the good, that is, by imagining 
a devil. In the Vigilantius lecture notes, we find a contrast between the evil 
in human nature and the evil nature of a devil. “It is this, … [the propen-
sity to evil, M.T.], which may distinguish man from a devil, who views him-
self as governed by evil itself, and as author of the same, and who, therefore, 
readers who resist the idea of doing evil to evil’s sake, and so would not describe the badass 
in such terms, they may read this section simply as how Kant can accommodate the badass 
within his empirical psychology.
40.   See n. 17.
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without struggle or inducement, engages in no actions other than bad ones” 
(VE 27:572). In the Collins lecture notes, the idea of being who, by nature, is 
predisposed to “devilish evil” is the idea of a being “where there is no seed 
of good at all, not even a good will” (VE 27:317). These are claims about the 
fundamental nature of the types of beings in question, and therefore they are 
claims from the perspective of Kant’s transcendental psychology.41 Human 
beings are not devils. Rather, according to Kant, human beings occupy middle 
ground between angels and devils.
Perhaps, then, if human beings are not devils, they are part angel (having 
a predisposition to moral goodness) and part devil (a predisposition to 
malice). However, this is not possible, according to Kant. Given that human 
beings have a predisposition to moral goodness, to suppose they also have a 
predisposition to malicious evil (evil for evil’s sake) involves a contradiction 
of the following sort. The predisposition to moral goodness, we have noted, is 
the source of moral reasons and associated motivation. Moral reasons include 
reasons to promote the happiness of others. To suppose that humans also 
have a predisposition to malicious evil is to suppose they have a source of 
reasons antithetical to moral reasons; that is, that by nature human beings 
have, for example, underivative reasons to pursue such ends as promoting 
the misery of human beings. For Kant, this would be to suppose that one’s 
rational nature is inherently contradictory and so something impossible.42 
I believe this (or something like it) is the line of thinking involved where Kant 
is considering various alternative hypotheses for locating the ground of evil 
(R 6:35). One hypothesis is that the ground is one’s sensuous nature and the 
natural inclinations originating from it. The other is that evil (or malice on 
the present assumption) is grounded in one’s rational nature. Kant rejects 
the first because he thinks that such inclinations themselves bear no direct 
relation to evil and that we are not in any case responsible for them. He 
rejects the idea of “an evil reason” (i.e., reasons to pursue evil for its own sake) 
“because resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive 
(for without any incentive the power of choice cannot be determined, and so 
the subject would be a diabolical being)” (R 6:35). On the present reading, 
then, raising resistance to the law as itself an incentive (i.e., as an underivative 
reason to act contrary to the law) is to conceive of practical reason as itself 
corrupt, something Kant thinks is not possible.
41.   Notice that Kant’s view is not that the very idea of a diabolical being is conceptually inco-
herent. He thinks that both devils and angels are possible beings.
42.   On the kind of incoherence concerning directly conflicting normative reasons under 
consideration here, see Caswell 2007.
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The proposal I  am making, then, is to interpret Kant’s remarks about 
diabolical evil as being about fundamental aspects of human nature— about 
the nature of the original predispositions that characterize human beings as 
rational, accountable agents. If we do this, and restrict Kant’s denial of the 
possibility of diabolical human beings to a claim of transcendental psychology, 
it remains an open question whether it is possible for an embodied human 
being to become a badass as Card conceives them. Let us proceed, then, to 
consider this.
The prima facie case for supposing that Kant’s empirical psychology 
recognizes badass psychology is, I  think, clear. In the previous section, 
I called attention to Kant’s characterization of the vices of hatred as involv-
ing an “immediate inclination” to evil and as thus directly evil, contrasting 
such directly evil vices as envy, ingratitude, Schadenfreude (and later in the 
Metaphysics of Morals, malice) with the vice of avarice that is only indirectly 
evil. A natural interpretation of having an “immediate inclination” to cause 
another person to suffer— to torture someone for the satisfaction it brings 
one to be doing evil— is that it is an inclination to do evil for evil’s sake.43 In 
the passage where Kant is contrasting vices that are directly evil with those 
that are only indirectly evil, he asks whether such immediacy “is human and 
natural” (VE 27:440). The passage continues:
The question may be raised, whether the human soul contains an 
immediate inclination to evil, and thus a propensity for devilish vice. 
We call a thing devilish when the evil in man is carried to the point of 
exceeding the level of human nature, just as we call angelic the good-
ness that surpasses the nature of man … . There is reason to believe, 
however, that in the nature of man’s soul there resides no immediate 
inclination to evil, but that its tendency to evil is only in an indirect 
fashion. (VE 27:440– 1)
Kant goes on in this passage to claim that humans cannot be so ungrateful 
as to hate one’s benefactor nor do they have an “immediate urge” to rejoice at 
another’s misfortune. He concludes, remarking: “Man therefore has no direct 
inclination toward evil qua evil, but only an indirect one” (VE 27:440– 1).44
43.   Allen Wood 2010: 154 also makes this point.
44.   However, the passage goes on to note that the germ of Schadenfreude seems to be appar-
ent in young children, which one might use in arguing that human beings do, by nature, 
have an immediate inclination to evil. However, the passage overall seems to side with the 
claim that human beings have only an indirect inclination toward evil qua evil.
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Given that Kant claims that one can be so ungrateful to one’s benefactor as 
to hate him and thus come to have an immediate inclination to evil directed 
toward that benefactor, I think the passage just quoted is to be read as asking a 
question about the fundamental nature of the human being. At the most fun-
damental level of human nature, is it true of human beings that the “human 
soul” includes an immediate inclination to evil? A “no” answer to this ques-
tion is compatible with allowing that embodied human beings can come to 
hate others to such a degree that one takes satisfaction in hurting them for no 
other reason than that to do so is to be cruel, the mark of a real badass.
To return to my proposal:  Kant’s denial of diabolical human beings is 
a denial from the perspective of a priori transcendental psychology. This is 
important because it allows Kant to maintain that human beings are not 
the kinds of creature who by nature have a predisposition to malicious evil, 
yet also allows that human beings are capable of becoming badasses and thus 
capable of doing evil for evil’s sake.
I know of two considerations that stand in prima facie opposition to my 
claim that Kant’s moral psychology accommodates the badass, so described. 
One is Kant’s apparent acceptance of a version of the guise of the good— the 
idea that all intentional action is undertaken in the belief that the action or 
end aimed at is in some respect good. The other is that Kant’s normative- 
motivational dualism rules out doing evil for the sake of evil. Let us 
consider these.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Chapter II, “On the Concept of an Object 
of Pure Practical Reason,” Kant considers “an old formula of the schools” 
(KpV 5:59) that we desire nothing except under the form of the good, and nothing is 
avoided except under the form of the bad. In commenting on this formula, Kant 
notes that the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are ambiguous and can refer to two dif-
ferent concepts which in German are designated by das Gute (good) and das 
Wohl (well- being), and das Böse (evil) and das Übel (ill- being). Kant goes on to 
claim that it is doubtful that the formula is true if the concepts involved are 
those of well- being and ill- being, but “indubitably certain” if understood as 
saying that “we will nothing under the direction of reason except insofar as 
we hold it to be good or evil” (KpV 5:60). The key expression here is “under 
the direction of reason.” The badass wills the gratuitous suffering he inflicts 
on his victims. He does not act under the direction of reason, according to 
Kant, because reason does not direct one to inflict gratuitous suffering. The 
badass does value inflicting such harm, but he need not suppose that such 
actions are valuable in the sense that he has objectively good reason to do 
what he does. If we understand Kant’s version of the guise of the good in this 
manner, restricted to what one does under the direction of reason, then Kant’s 
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guise of the good is not clearly at odds with recognizing the psychology of the 
badass. To defend this interpretation requires more clarification and defense 
than space allows, so I will leave the matter up in the air and file it under “to be 
taken up on another occasion” and move on to Kant’s normative- motivational 
psychological dualism.
How is it possible, then, to become a badass, given Kant’s normative- 
motivational dualism, and in light of the fact that human beings do not 
have a predisposition to malicious evil? Again, space does not allow a full 
treatment of the matter; however, in outline, I believe the story goes as fol-
lows.45 First, as we know, according to this dualism, there are two funda-
mental sources of reasons for action— morality and self- love.46 One is born 
with a propensity to elevate reasons of the latter sort over reasons of the 
former sort. This is the propensity to depravity. However, one can become a 
malicious person, taking immediate pleasure or satisfaction in the suffering 
of others. One can even go so far as to become a badass in the following 
way. One does not start life with a predisposition to do evil for the sake of 
evil, however, perhaps because one was abused as a child, one comes to be 
misanthropic— what Kant refers to as “an enemy of humanity” (MS 6:450). 
Indeed, one comes to hate humanity and hate it deeply, eventually coming 
to take immediate pleasure in making others suffer— a real badass. It is, 
after all, a common phenomenon that actions originally done merely as a 
means to some desirable end are later desired intrinsically. One attends a 
jazz concert merely in order to be with friends, having no desire to hear such 
music. Over time, after many such concerts, one comes to appreciate the 
nuance and subtlety of the jazz one hears and comes to enjoy it. Of course, 
even if this phenomenon is common, it is a further step to claim that Kant’s 
45.   A full development of the sketch to follow would require addressing the difficult issue 
of Kant’s conception of self- love including his psychological hedonism. I understand Kant’s 
conception of self- love as not committed to some narrow form of psychological egoism. 
Kant, after all, refers to individuals who are naturally sympathetic, who “without any other 
motive of vanity or self- interest they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them 
and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work” (G 4:398). 
Sophisticated interpretations of Kant’s psychological hedonism are advanced by Andrews 
Reath 1989 (reprinted in Reath 2006), and Barbara Herman 2000 (reprinted in Herman 
2007). See also Richard McCarty 2009: 48– 52. My basic claim here is that Kant’s theory of 
non- moral action is consistent with the psychology of the badass.
46.   Regarding self- love, in the second Critique Kant writes, “This propensity to make oneself 
as having subjective determining grounds of choice into objective determining grounds of 
the will in general can be called self- love” (KpV 5:74). Notice that this characterization of self- 
love does not commit Kant to egoism with respect to non- moral motivation; it leaves open 
what the objects of one’s inclinations are.
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empirical psychology can make sense of the aspiring badass who eventually 
succeeds in becoming one. What, then, might Kant say about the psycholog-
ical mechanisms by which one becomes a badass? Indeed, is his conception 
of human psychology rich enough to address this question? Let us conclude 
this section by briefly considering these questions.
In “Taking Pride in Being Bad,” Card considers the sort of process by 
which one could become a badass. In very rough outline, it goes as follows. 
She borrows Korsgaard’s (1996) notion of a self- concept that allows for much 
variety in the sorts of self- concepts one can embrace. She then appeals to 
Lorna Smith Benjamin’s (2005) incorporation of John Bowlby’s (1969, 
1989)  Attachment Theory that Benjamin argues can illuminate perverse, 
irrational, and perhaps downright diabolical behavior. Finally, on the basis of 
these ideas, Card speculates that the badass is someone who, at some stage in 
life, becomes attached to someone else taken by the aspirant to be a badass, 
seeking to imitate the person’s behavior and psyche— eventually taking pride 
in being a badass. With this story in mind, Card comments on Kant’s moral 
psychology:
Kant’s position that evil in human beings is not diabolical now seems 
partly right and partly wrong. It seems right that there is no need to 
suppose a fundamental predisposition to the bad in human nature. 
But people can knowingly choose to do evil without believing it to be 
prudent, and it is possible to come to value being bad. A predisposition 
to form attachments to others, missing in Kant’s moral psychology, 
could explain why some people come to take pride in being bad … . 
What seems most right about the Kantian denial of diabolical evil, 
from the point of view of attachment theory, is that attachment even 
to an immoral model is not initially diabolical, in Kant’s sense of the 
term. (2017: 54)
I believe there is a place in Kant’s moral psychology for something like 
attachment theory, even if it is not something that Kant considers. In the 
lectures on ethics, we find Kant theorizing about the source of the vices of 
hatred. He traces their origin to the impulse (Trieb) of emulation, implanted 
in human nature, whose purpose “really lay in inciting men to constant 
cultivation of greater perfection in themselves by comparison with others” 
(VE 27:678). However, this same impulse can lead to rivalry in which one 
works against the well- being and standing of others that results in “a side 
of human nature that has become malignant” (VE 27:678). Of course, in 
order to emulate someone, one must be able to imitate them— do what they 
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do, take on the attitudes they have. Moreover, imitation is something Kant 
mentions in a number of places, particularly in his work on pedagogy, where 
he stresses the importance of imitation in the proper formation of children. 
“Parents who are already educated are examples for imitation by means of 
which children form themselves” (Päd 9:447). Furthermore, commenting 
on the fact that concepts of the understanding, such as cause and virtue, 
though not drawn from experience, only arise on the occasion of experience, 
Kant remarks: “No human being would have the concept of virtue if he were 
always among rogues” (LM 28:233). If the rogues in question were badasses, 
then presumably being around only such individuals would result in one’s 
becoming like them.
Although Kant does not provide a detailed psychological story about 
imitation, his views allow for an account of how, through attachment and 
imitation, human beings without a predisposition to malicious evil can 
come to value cruelty for the sake of cruelty:  that is, they come to have 
an immediate inclination to harm others for the sake of harming them. 
Therefore, as far as Kant’s normative- motivational dualism is concerned, 
I  see no reason why Kant’s empirical psychology cannot recognize the 
badass. If one counts the badass as someone who does evil for the sake 
of evil, then Kant’s empirical psychology does countenance people who fit 
this description.
10.7.  Conclusion
My concern throughout has been with the descriptive adequacy of Kant’s con-
ception of moral evil. I have made a case, based partly on restricting Kant’s 
rigorism that his theory can accommodate the central types of case, including 
the badass, that Card and others appeal to in objecting to his conception of 
moral evil.47 I have also made a case for the claim that, once Kant’s conception 
of the vices of hatred are included in his conception of moral evil, his view 
can accommodate commonsense judgments about the varying magnitude of 
moral evils.
47.   In addition to cases of indeterminacy, moral fragmentation, and the badass, Card 
2002: 211– 34 considers so- called grey zone cases exemplified by Auschwitz prisoners who 
accepted positions of ghetto police in charge of rounding up other prisoners to be sent to 
their death. She asks whether, despite being complicit in evils done to those prisoners, such 
individuals had an evil will. Explaining how Kant’s moral psychology of evil would deal with 
such cases is a task for another article.
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Of course, even if I have succeeding in doing all this, there remains the 
question of whether Kant’s conception properly explains human evil. In 
Religion 1, the focus is on the ultimate source of evil being the corruption of the 
human will. Since the late 1960s, some social psychologists, and philosophers 
following them, have attacked the so- called dispositionalist explanation of 
behavior (which appeals to character traits in explaining evil) in favor of a 
situationist account. According to situationism, good people can be induced 
to perform evil deeds as a result of the situation in which they find themselves. 
In general, facts about one’s situation rather than facts about character do 
the heavy lifting in explaining the evil people do. Situationism, then, viewed 
as alternative explanation of evil, seemingly represents a challenge Kant’s 
apparent dispositionalist account.48
Here is not the place to get into this apparent challenge. I will end by just 
noting that Kant’s primary aim in Religion 1 was to discover the fundamental 
source of moral evil, which he finds in the individual, as a member of the 
human species. Kant’s hypothesis that human beings have an innate pro-
pensity to evil is compatible with claims about individuals lacking the sort 
of stable character traits featured in dispositionalist accounts, and it is also 
compatible (so I would argue) with situational forces triggering evil behavior. 
Regarding stable character traits, Kant remarks that “character is set very late, 
approximately by age forty, for one can there best separate the concepts from 
instincts” (LA 25:654). This is because at approximately that age, explains 
Kant, instincts and inclinations have lost their force, which allows one to 
settle on firm principles governing action. Furthermore, relying on empirical 
evidence, as Kant does (R 6:32– 4), but without embracing Kant’s metaphysi-
cal commitments, it is plausible that human beings have a deep- seated ten-
dency to elevate self- love over morality. Situationism highlights just how frail 
even “good” individuals— individuals of good morals, but lacking in moral 
character— can be when they encounter challenging circumstances. Kant 
would agree.
48.   The locus classicus for situationism is Walter Mischel’s 1968 book. For a summary of key 
experimental evidence in favor of situationism, including details about Philip Zimbardo’s 
Stanford Prison Experiment, see Zimbardo 2007. For remarks about the current state of sit-
uationism within social psychology and in philosophy, see Miller 2016. See also Wielenberg 
2006, who defends Kant against the situationist challenge.
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